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This article analyzes current military penetration of Indonesia's higher central 
government bureaucracy. Any civilian or military officeholder in this bureaucracy 
is referred to as a karyawan. The article focuses on the incumbent Cabinet and 
topmost echelon of civil service officials. Findings are based on public biographies 
of these persons and published specialized secondary sources on the Indonesian 
military. The principal conclusions follow below.
The Higher Central Bureaucracy
The Indonesian military has long played a "dual civil and military function." 
Military karyawan, active duty and retired officers in civilian assignments, comprise 
an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the dominant military 
faction, that of President Suharto and his 1945 Generation supporters.
--The military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy are especially critical 
actors in maintaining the Suharto regime.
--Together with their civilian karyawan colleagues, virtually all of them wield 
decision-making powers of some considerable degree.
--Some mix of military and civilian karyawan occurs in all Cabinet Departments 
except the Department of Defense and Security, now entirely military-controlled.
--The Indonesian armed forces' doctrinal commitment to preventing civilian con­
trol of the military has resulted in the Department of Defense and Security be­
coming effectively equivalent to the consolidated armed forces' staff and command 
structure.
Extent of Military Penetration
Active and retired military karyawan now occupy half the positions in the Indo­
nesian higher central bureaucracy.
--At the highest levels, military penetration remains near complete (the President 
and his principal immediate aides) or has increased (Coordinating Ministers) over 
the course of the New Order regime (1966 to the present).
--Shifts to historical high points of military penetration occurred in the two top 
Departmental positions (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a pattern 
reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General attached to each Depart­
ment.
* The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect 




--Civilians maintained clear numerical edges only in positions with the most spe­
cialized functions (Ministers of State and Directors-General), but in both such 
instances work under mainly military supervisors.
--There is no practical evidence suggesting an effort to "recivilianize" even grad­
ually those slots now held by military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Structuring Military Domination
Military karyawan, in concert with supportive civilian karyawan colleagues, 
dominate the affairs of every Cabinet Department.
--The most crucial Departments for ensuring regime maintenance, Defense and 
Security and Home Affairs, are under the most solid military control (100 percent 
and 89 percent of their leading positions, respectively).
--Over the duration of the New Order, the armed forces have never held less than 
90 percent of the leading positions in the Department of Defense and Security.
--Internal armed forces personnel and organizational changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 
1974-75, and 1978-81 increasingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the 
Defense Ministry in Jakarta, and the person of the Defense Minister himself.
--Military penetration of the Department of Home Affairs has risen more steadily 
and markedly over the course of the New Order than in any other Department 
(from 29 percent of the leading positions in 1966, to 71 percent in 1971, and 89 
percent currently).
--Greater military penetration of particular Departments (Information, Social 
Affairs, Religion, Foreign Affairs, and Justice) has proceeded alongside the in­
crease in military incumbency for specific categories of office. In two other De­
partments (Communications, Manpower and Transmigration) military penetration 
continued at high levels throughout the New Order.
--There is no Department in which the military is not suitably placed, through 
filling the Secretary-General or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to 
control and remain apprised of the full range of Departmental activities. Direct 
Presidential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to maintain these capa­
bilities .
--The topmost civilian technocrats and career civil servants, whose tenure de­
pends on their maintaining the trust of military patrons, are at least as active 
public proponents of government policies as the military karyawan.
--Save only in two cases, all civilians of Ministerial rank have one or more ex­
plicit military credentials or linkages which enhance their attractiveness to, or 
ability to work with, their military colleagues.
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Once disparaged by senior officers, karyawan assignments now carry increased 
rank and prestige.
--Disparagement of karyawan assignments by military officers has decreased as 
the perceived importance of controlling the central bureaucracy and its actual 
penetration by the military has increased.
--Wide public visibility and the impeccable military credentials of many serving 
military karyawan have also worked to elevate the prestige accorded the role by 
older and younger officers alike.
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--The attractiveness and power of the military karyawan role has been yet fur­
ther enhanced because the Army, the most prestigious service, occupies the 
great bulk (81 percent) of military karyawan positions.
--Finally, the military karyawan has grown in officer esteem because the military 
ranks of those holding these positions have sharply escalated (from mainly Lieu­
tenant-Colonels or Colonels to Major-Generals in the case of the Army) over the 
course of the New Order.
Generational Power Monopoly
The 1945 Generation, those who successfully waged armed struggle in the Indo­
nesian Revolution, retains a near monopoly of military karyawan slots in the higher 
central bureaucracy and intends to hold this power base for at least the next five 
years.
--This solid control by the 1945 Generation persists despite the fact that all 
those military karyawan born by 1925 (61 percent of the total) have now been 
retired from active duty status.
--The Ministry of Defense and Security maintains effective control of retired 
military karyawan by holding military rank promotion exercises for them and 
mandating their membership in a military retirees association, through which 
loyalty to the armed forces is reinforced. Retired military karyawan also remain 
embedded in long-term webs of patron-client and close friendship networks, 
mainly composed of fellow officers.
--The determination of President Suharto and the readiness of the 1945 Genera­
tion to continue in karyawan roles make chances of a voluntary generational suc­
cession within military karyawan ranks remote over the next five years.
--There is not yet a single graduate of the new military academy at Magelang 
filling a karyawan position in the higher central bureaucracy.
The Successor Generation Crisis
The 1945 Generation faction loyal to President Suharto evidently intends to re­
tain its dominance in the higher central bureaucracy to preside over a smooth trans­
fer of leadership to Young Generation officers in the Army staff and command struc­
ture. This formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed.
--The 1945 Generation Army leadership (from all current factions) has given 
assurances to the Young Generation Army officers that an intra-Army inter- 
generational power transfer will be substantially accomplished in 1983. Defense 
and Security Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions promised 
Young Generation officers this change of generations within the Army will occur.
--The formula for regime maintenance thus seems to be that for some indetermi­
nate period of time there will be a sharp and unprecedented cleavage between 
two major military power centers, the 1945 Generation military karyawan control­
ling politics and the Young Generation officers in the staff and command struc­
ture controlling the guns.
--It is far from clear that the Young Generation Army officers will accede to their 
subordinate political role in this emerging new-model New Order.
--No justification exists in Army doctrine for such generational stratification in 
the carrying out of the political aspects of the armed forces' dual civil and mili­
tary function.
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--It is likely that Young Generation Army officers will therefore increasingly 
probe privately and publicly the operational meaning of the armed forces' dual 
function in a changing Indonesia.
--Several important retired 1945 Generation factions already critical of the Suhar­
to faction's implementation of the dual function include widely respected officers 
who have influenced the Young Generation intellectually during their professional 
military education.
--Successful generational successions in political leadership in Malaysia and 
Singapore are also likely to heighten Young Generation Army officers' concerns 
that the means for a comparable transition in Indonesia has not yet been fully 
worked out.
Introduction
In this article I will assess the scope, patterns, and implications for regime 
maintenance of penetration of Indonesia's higher central bureaucracy by the coun­
try's dominant military faction. That bureaucracy is defined here as the incumbent 
Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) and the topmost echelon of 
officials in its component Departments.1 Any civilian or military officeholder in the 
higher bureaucracy is referred to as a karyawan, essentially an honorific equiva­
lent of "functionary."2
This particular group of military karyawan, active duty and retired officers in 
top civilian bureaucratic assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, 
and strategic segment of the broader military elite, particularly in the context of 
the vital regime maintenance issue of generational succession within ABRI (Angka- 
tan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed F orces).3 Other 
major military elite segments, such as other karyawan long active in the public and 
private sectors of the economy or active-duty flag- and field-grade officers within
1. Appendix A contains a full list of offices and their civilian and military incum­
bents in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy. Positions in what are officially 
labeled Higher State Institutions (Lembaga Tertinggi/Tinggi Negara) and Non- 
Departmental Government Boards (Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departmen), vary 
greatly in potential influence and fall outside the focus of this article. However, 
such positions ought to be included in a more complete study of military karyawan.
A list of civilian and military incumbents in leading roles in these additional bodies 
appears for reference purposes in Appendix B. About half these incumbents, as in 
the higher central bureaucracy, are military karyawan.
2. The elastic coined term karyawan, as used in the broadest sense by the military, 
embraces any "worker" in a civilian (s ip il)  position, governmental or nongovernmen­
tal. However, karyawan most often denotes higher-status government officials, 
whether civilian or military.
3. Includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Some recent sentiment for 
separating the Police from ABRI and restoring their civilian role (lost since 1961) 
has been voiced by parliamentarians of both opposition parties. However, the Police 
internal security role is thoroughly integrated with that of the Army and govern­
ment intelligence agencies. Reaction from pro-government parliamentarians and 
from the National Police Chief was therefore predictably negative. Still, the Police, 
despite better overall educational qualifications at senior officer levels than the 
other services, hold relatively few ka rya  positions. See Kompas, September 8, 24, 
and 25 and October 2, 1981, and A ngkatan B e rse n ja ta , September 16, 1981.
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the general and separate services’ staff and command structures, are treated here 
only when they overlap with the karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.
Full-dress studies of the Indonesian military are remarkably few, usually his­
torical, sometimes overly general, and occasionally ideologically laden.4 Opportuni­
ties for sustained, direct, scholarly access to Indonesia's military establishment are 
controlled and pose real limits in outsiders' ability to answer some basic questions. 
Particularly relevant here is the unavailability of any official Indonesian roster of 
military karyawan.
However, it is also the case that a very large amount and considerable variety 
of pertinent public source materials have simply not been fully exploited or even 
examined.5 Findings reported here, derived from both these primary data and re­
liable secondary sources, are current as of mid-December 1981. The new (post-1972) 
spelling system is used throughout for all Indonesian words, including personal names.6
The H ighe r C en tra l B ureaucracy
For analytic purposes, the higher central bureaucracy here encompasses the 
Development Cabinet and its top Departmental leadership. Specific offices included 
are
• the Presidency (Kepresidenan)--the President and Vice-President,
• the State Secretariat (Sekretariat Negara)--eight key aides supporting 
the Presidency,7
4. Appendix D contains a list of the more important of these studies written in 
English. For a dated but useful review of some of the earlier literature, see Ulf 
Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics," Journa l o f  Asian  
S tud ies , 31, 2 (February 1972), pp. 355-65. For a recent survey from a different 
perspective, see Richard Robison, "Culture, Politics, and Economy in the Political 
History of the New Order," Indonesia , 31 (April 1981), pp. 1-29.
5. One major, almost wholly neglected, resource is the wide variety of Indonesian 
military magazines and journals, such as Dharmasena (Hankam), Karya Wira Ja ti 
(Seskoad), Ketahanan Nasional (Lemhanas), A k a b r i (Akabri), and Darma P u tra  
(Kostrad) . Similarly, military-sponsored or related newspapers like A ngkatan B e r-  
senjata  and B e rita  Yudha have seldom been used in a systematic way despite the 
wealth of explicit materials on the military appearing daily in them. General and 
specialized biographic directories and rosters also remain unexploited. Since this 
last category of resources has been employed extensively in this article, a list of 
the more useful compilations appears in Appendix C. Most of the limited number of 
major monograph-length studies on the Indonesian military are cited in Appendix D .
6. Personal names appear in the new spelling (ejaan yang  d isem purnakan) even 
when the individual involved uses the old spelling or some mix of old and new.
This facilitates accurate pronunciation of names by readers not familiar with the 
large number of persons involved. Indonesian newspapers frequently spell a given 
individual's name in several ways. Consequently, readers needing reliable guides 
to personally preferred spelling of names should consult the Jakarta telephone 
directory and official government publications.
7. Effectively, this means supporting President Suharto. Vice-President Malik re­
lies mainly on his own personal staff selected by the Secretariat. The Head (Kepala)
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• three senior Coordinating Ministers (Menteri Koordinator), each at least 
nominally responsible for oversight of several Cabinet Departments,
• three Ministers of State (Menteri Negara) assigned special functions, 8
• seventeen Ministers (Menteri), heads of the Cabinet Departments proper,
• six Junior Ministers (Menteri Muda) handling specific programs, 9
• eighteen Secretary-General (Sekretaris Jenderal) level persons, usually 
the top civil servant in a Department,
• seventeen Inspectors-General (Inspektur Jenderal) empowered to inquire 
into any matter within their respective departments,
• seventy-one Directors-General (Direktur Jenderal) , numbers varying 
among Departments, subordinate to their respective Secretaries-General.
The idealized formal, as opposed to the actual informal, lines of authority in 
this hierarchy of positions (for any given Department) appears below. Such or­
ganization charts for the higher central bureaucracy are sparse and inconsistent. 
The relationships shown are therefore indicative rather than definitive.
FORMAL LINES OF AUTHORITY IN 





of the Presidential Household (Rumah Tangga Kepresidenan), while an aide, does 
not have Secretary (Sekretaris) rank and is excluded from consideration.
8. State Secretary Sudharmono also has the personal rank of Minister of State, but 
because he functions as the paramount Presidential aide in the State Secretariat,
is counted only in that category.
9. Five under Cabinet Ministers and one (Women's Affairs) under a Coordinating 
Minister (People's Welfare).
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While it is difficult to be precise, informally power is concentrated in the Presi­
dent, with the State Secretary (Sekretaris Negara) acting very effectively as the 
principal screen. Generally, the Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial, 
and Industrial Affairs (and indirectly through him, his long-time economist Minis­
terial colleagues) and the Department Ministers under the Coordinating Minister for 
Political and Security Affairs (and that Minister himself to a lesser degree) are best 
able to gain the cooperation of State Secretariat gatekeepers for direct access to 
the President.
The Commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), as head of the principal state 
intelligence body with operational responsibilities, has unique Presidential access, 
even though he is nominally under the Minister of Defense. Similarly, other lesser 
officials may sometimes wield more power than formal superiors because of personal 
ties to leading figures in and out of government. However, all the positions in the 
higher central bureaucracy are power centers of some significance. Virtually all 
incumbents, including Directors-General, appear regularly and prominently in the 
press, most often in roles of decision makers or implementers of decisions of those 
above them in the bureaucratic hierarchy.
Coordinating Ministers by one or another name10 have been present in Indone­
sian Cabinets since 1959. During President Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Presi­
dent Suharto's early New Order, such persons were both more numerous and more 
powerful than in the current Third Development Cabinet. As the total number of 
portfolios in Cabinets declined, so did first the number and then the power of Coor­
dinating Ministers. Generally, increased power for Department Ministers has meant 
decreased power for Coordinating Ministers. Today's three Coordinating Ministers 
do not appear in the press as frequently as the Department Ministers they oversee.
Political and Security Affairs Coordinating Minister Panggabean and Economic, 
Financial, and Industrial Affairs Coordinating Minister Wijoyo are able to exert in­
fluence when necessary,due to their having the confidence and ear of the President. 
People's Welfare Coordinating Minister Surono enjoys neither, and has accordingly 
played in public the figurehead role designed for him. Panggabean covers the im­
portant "security" Departments, Wijoyo all the "development" ones (plus Communi­
cations), and Surono the lesser "social" domains.11
Among the Departments, Hankam (Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Depart­
ment of Defense and Security) differs in two major respects from all others. First, 
it is literally wholly controlled by the military. Second, it has neither a Secretary- 
General nor any Directors-General.
Military control of Hankam has its roots in the so-called 17 October 1952 Affair, 
a failed coup d'etat led by General Nasution and his military modernizers but con­
founded by Sukarno's resistance. Subsequently, civilian politicians were able to 
replace with ease key figures in a sharply divided Army. By 1955, both "pro 17 
October" and "anti 17 October" military had become convinced such "civilian inter-
10. "Core Ministers" in the July 1959 Work Cabinet (Kabinet Kerja), "Deputy First 
Ministers" in the March 1962 Work Cabinet, and "Chief Ministers" in the July 1966 
Ampera (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat, Message of the People's Suffering) Cabinet.
11. This hardly means the "social" Departments are inconsequential. Indeed, 
three of these Departments--Religion, Manpower and Transmigration, and Educa­
tion and Culture--perform important political control functions over Muslim organi­
zations, the urban labor force, and university and secondary school students re­
spectively, each seen as potentially destabilizing forces by the regime.
96
ALLOTMENTS OF PORTFOLIOS TO COORDINATING 
MINISTERS IN THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET
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ference" could only be halted if the Defense Minister was a military man selected 
in accordance with seniority principles. This demand was formalized in what is 
now known as the "Yogya Charter." Since 1959, the Defense Minister has "by 
tradition" been military. Under Suharto's New Order, ABRI's now doctrinal rejec­
tion of "civilian control of the military" has reached the point where Hankam is for 
all practical purposes equivalent to the consolidated ABRI staff and command struc­
ture.
The Hankam Minister doubles as Commander (Panglima) of ABRI. Immediately 
under him are two closely related positions: Deputy Commander (Wakil Panglima) of 
ABRI/Commander of Kopkamtib and Chief-of-Staff (Kepala Staf) of Kopkamtib. 
These two positions were equated to those of Secretary-General in other Depart­
ments. One step down in Hankam's precedence order are seven positions with 
Chief-of-Staff rank (distinct from the autonomous Kopkamtib apparatus). Strictly 
from an organizational point of view, their rank is similar to that of Directors- 
General in other Departments. Three of these positions are the top military staff 
slots, Chiefs-of-Staff for Operations, Administration, and Functional Affairs. The 
remaining four are Chiefs-of-Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the 
National Police Chief.
Active and retired military officers now occupy half (50 percent) of the 145 posi­
tions in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy.12 Specifically, these military 
karyawan include
12. The Indonesian government does not publish for public consumption a list of 
its officials containing any military ranks they may have. Consequently, this and 
all subsequent figures were derived as follows. A list of last known incumbents in 
what is here termed the higher central bureaucracy was extracted from B uku Alamat 
Pejabat Negara R . l.  1981 ( R epublic o f  Indonesia Government O ffic ia ls  A ddress Book 
1981), an annual quasi-official roster distributed by Yayasan Kesejahteraan Jaya- 
karta Kodam V Jaya (Jayakarta Welfare Foundation of Military Area Command V, 
Greater Jakarta). Nine national daily newspapers were then used to verify this 
list and ascertain changes in incumbents. This yielded a list of 145 incumbents,
144 known to be current and one the last known. Each name on this list was 
then checked for military or civilian status by using an alphabetic file of public 
military biographies put together mainly from the sources cited in Appendix C. The 
final list complete with current military ranks of incumbents is given in Appendix A.
E xten t o f  M ilita ry  P enetra tion
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• the President (a retired four-star General),
• seven of his eight principal aides (88percent) in the State Secretariat,13 14
• two of the three Coordinating Ministers (Political and Security Affairs, 
People’s Welfare, both retired four-star Generals),
• eight of seventeen Department Ministers (47 percent),
• two of six Junior Ministers (33 percent),
• sixteen of eighteen Secretary-General level slots (89 percent),
• eleven of seventeen Inspector-Generalships (65 percent),
• twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts (35 percent).
In addition, the Head and Deputy Head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen 
Negara, State Intelligence Coordinating Body), responsible for internal security 
estimates, are military (General Yoga Sugama and Lieutenant-General L. Benny Mur- 
dani, respectively). Bakin does not usually appear in official lists of government 
officeslit but maintains an extensive network and reports directly to the President.15
Trends
How does this level of penetration compare with earlier periods in the New Or­
der? Some reliable reference points are tallies made by Crouch for 1966,16Emmerson
Conceivably, a very few military figures may not have been identified as such, and 
even fewer civilians may have been categorized as military. Any such errors should 
not materially change any of the conclusions drawn here, but the author would 
appreciate knowing of any suspected misclassifications.
13. Sometimes this group is collectively referred to loosely as "the palace," so 
named because of their ready access to President Suharto, whose ceremonial head­
quarters is Istana Merdeka (Independence Palace).
14. These two top Bakin officials are not counted in the higher central bureaucracy, 
as defined here.
15. General Yoga has been Head of Bakin since 1974 and remains in this position 
despite his retirement from active duty in mid-1981. He was simultaneously Chief - 
of-Staff of Kopkamtib from mid-1978 through the end of 1980. Lieutenant-General 
Murdani, despite his low public profile one of the most important figures in the re­
gime, is not only Deputy Head of Bakin but also Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) 
and Head of the Strategic Intelligence Center (Kapusintelstrat) in Hankam (both 
positions technically under the Chief-of-Staff for Operations). He is also a Suharto 
confidant on par with Information Minister Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo and In­
spector-General for Development Major-General Sujono Humardani. Together with 
them, he is a major patron of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
one of the few persistently influential think-tanks in Indonesia. With Defense Min­
ister General Yusuf, he has been intimately involved with managing the conflict in 
East Timor. For more details, see Hamish McDonald, S uharto 's  Indonesia  (Black­
burn [Australia]: Fontana Books, 1980).
16. Harold Crouch, The A rm y and P o litics in  Indonesia  (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1978), pp. 241-42. His figures are based on an August 8, 1966 Angkatan  
B ersenjata  list including military statuses.
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for 1967,17 and MacDougall for July 1971.18 These are the principal trends.
• The President remains military (from 1967 on ), the Vice-President 
civilian (from 1973).19 20
• The President's principal aides remain overwhelmingly military (all 8 in 
1971, 7 of 8 in 1981).
• Earlier counterparts of today's Coordinating Ministers were less likely to 
be military (1 of 5 in 1966, 0 of 3 in 1971, 2 of 3 in 1981).
• Ministers of State, with their specialized responsibilities, continued to be 
wholly civilian (1971 and now).
• Department Ministers were 44 percent military at the beginning of the New 
Order in 1966-67 and in July 1971, dropped to 22 percent military in the 
new Cabinet appointed in September of that year, 0 but now stand at an 
all-time high of 47 percent military.21 *
• Military-held Secretary-Generalships stood at 55 percent in 1966-67, 
dropped to 41 percent in 1971, but have dramatically increased to 89 
percent today.
• Inspector-Generalships declined slightly from 73 percent military in 1971 
(when only 11 Departments had them) to 65 percent now (when all do). 
Over this same time period, however, the absolute number of military 
Inspectors-General increased from 8 to 11.
• Director-Generalships seem to have been held at constant levels of military 
incumbency over the course of the New Order (36 percent in 1966, 36 per­
cent in 1971, 35 percent in 1981).
At the highest levels, military penetration has remained near complete (the 
President and his principal immediate aides) or increased (Coordinating Ministers). 
Cyclic shifts to historical high points of military penetration have occurred in the 
two top Departmental offices (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a 
pattern reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General in the upswing 
phase of the cycle. Civilians managed to maintain decisive numerical edges only
17. Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in 
Strength," in P olitica l Power and Communication in  Indones ia , ed. Karl Jackson 
and Lucian Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 100-103.
His 1967 figures are based on informed persons' knowledge of whether an incum­
bent was military or civilian.
18. Tallied from a list including military ranks in O. G. Roeder, compiler, Who's 
Who in  Indonesia  (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), pp. 521-28.
19. Sukarno remained titular President in the Cabinet formed in July 1966. Su­
harto became Acting President in March 1967 and President in March 1968. The 
Vice-Presidency was vacant from 1956 until March 1973.
20. A consequence of the July 1971 elections in which the government-backed Gol­
kar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) obtained 63 percent of the recorded popu­
lar vote.
21. This exceeds the figure for any Cabinet during Sukarno's Presidency, even 
those from the Guided Democracy period of 1959-65. Based on Emmerson's tallies
derived from Susan Finch and Daniel Lev, compilers, R epublic o f  Indonesia Cabinets 
1945-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965).
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in positions with the most differentiated functions (Ministers of State and Directors- 
General) although in both instances worked under mainly military superiors.
There is as yet no practical evidence of any effort to "re-civilianize" even grad­
ually military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy. Such a reversal of 
the historic trend would seriously upset the many dependent clients of serving mili­
tary karyawan. However, occasional statements by military spokesmen refer to ABRI's 
need only to guard "the strategic points" in the administration of the country.
Structuring Military Domination
For regime maintenance it is more critical that the military control certain De­
partments than others. One indicator of how President Suharto and his closest 
colleagues assess this matter is the proportion of top slots, from Coordinating Min­
ister down to Directors-General, filled by military officers. Using this gauge, the 
most crucial Departments are now Hankam (100 percent of its leading positions 
occupied by the military) and Home Affairs (89 percent).
Effective total military control of Hankam has its motivational origins in the 
united ABRI determination that never again should civilians be placed in positions 
whereby they could create disunity within or among the several armed services. 
Indeed, examination of Hankam rosters for 1966, 1971, and 1981 shows that ABRI 
has never held less than 90 percent of that Department's top slots.22 Moreover, 
these figures conceal unprecedented major organizational consolidation of the mili­
tary staff and command structure over the course of the New Order.
This prolonged process of concentrating power at the center began simply with 
the reshuffling, dismissal, detention, or killing of military officers considered un­
reliable in the purges and battles following the murders of six Army generals on 
the night of September 30, 1965 (officially labeled the 30 September Movement, 
Gerakan September Tigapuluh, with the deliberately sinister acronym Gestapu). 
Centralization advanced more sharply between November 1969 and April 1970 when 
service heads were downgraded from Ministerial rank to Chiefs-of-Staff (Chief for 
the Police) and lost operational control over their respective forces. Their staffs 
were shifted to Hankam. A revised system of Regional Defense Commands (Komando 
Wilayah Pertahanan, Kowilhan) integrating services in the field together with re­
moval of "native sons" from top command roles outside Java effectively ended any 
recurrent threat of "warlordism." All these changes also worked to institutionalize 
Army dominance over the other services.23
Another centralization exercise during 1974 and 1975 followed the anti-Japanese, 
anti-government riots of January 1974 with their related intra-Army intrigues (offi­
cially, the 15 January Calamity, Malapetaka 15 Januari, Malari). This shifted major 
staff and specialized agencies from Kopkamtib, seen as having abused power in 
anti-regime power plays, to clear Ministerial control under a rationalized system of
22. Based on the same sources as in the "Trends" section, except that, since 
Crouch provides no breakdowns by Department, tallies had to be made from a raw 
list of July 1966 positions (the Ampera Cabinet) found in Editors, "Continuity and 
Change: Four Indonesian Cabinets Since October 1, 1965," Indonesia , 2 (October 
1966). Positions in 1966 and 1971 subsequently consolidated were coded under 
their 1981 counterparts. Chief Ministers (1966) and certain State Ministers (1971) 
were equated with counterpart Coordinating Ministers (1981).
23. For details, see Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite after 
the Reorganization of 1969-70," Indones ia , 10 (October 1970), pp. 195-208.
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functionally ordered Chiefs-of-Staff and their principal Assistants (the current 
organizational format). 21t
Particularly after General Yusuf’ s appointment as Minister in 1978, still more 
power flowed to the center as a consequence of the need to deal with unanticipated 
protracted resistance in East Timor, increased outlays for arms and equipment 
modernization, long-delayed improvements in conditions of service for non-commis­
sioned officers (b in ta ra ) and enlisted men (tamtama) , adherence to plans for retir­
ing senior officers at age 55, and carefully calculated promotions for some younger 
ones.
While ABRI's struggle for ascendancy in Hankam began late in the period of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1949-57), its pursuit of dominance in Home Affairs is of 
more recent vintage. In no other Department has military penetration increased so 
steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order (29 percent of top slots in 
1966, 71 percent in 1971, 89 percent in 1981). ABRI’ s doctrine of a guerrilla-based 
territorial defense, official state policy from December 1960, already inclined it to 
exert influence in areas within the domain of Home Affairs (as well as other Depart­
ments outside Hankam).
But the Second Army Seminar in August 1966 yielded a revised doctrine, justi­
fying a considerably expanded non-military role for ABRI in deciding almost all na­
tional issues.24 5 Within Home Affairs, ABRI’s presence grew, along with doctrinally 
sanctified felt needs to control or oversee the governmental apparatus from provin­
cial down to village level,26 to assure positive outcomes in periodic electoral exer­
cises,27 and to advance regional development projects on which the regime's legiti­
macy came increasingly to rest. 28
24. For details, see Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," 
Indonesia , 18 (October 1974), pp. 153-67.
25. See particularly Chapter 4, "Indonesian Military Literature," in Harold May­
nard, "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philip­
pines" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976).
26. Through such military-dominated joint civilian-military institutions as the re­
gional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's Represen­
tative Council) and consultative forums (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Regional 
Leadership Deliberation). For a thorough fleshing out of how the Home Affairs' 
control system works, see Ronald Grant, "Administration in the Province of West 
Java: Patterns of Integration and Problems of Coordination" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Northern Illinois University, 1976).
27. Again through military-controlled institutions, including particularly the polit­
ical party-surrogate Golkar, and the mandatory membership of Korpri (Korps Pega- 
wai Republik Indonesia, Corps of Officials of the Republic of Indonesia). The two 
most extended treatments of such corporatist trends in Indonesia are David Reeve, 
"An Alternative to the Party System in Indonesia: An Historical Evaluation of the 
Functional Group Concept" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977) and 
Dwight King, "Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Mediation, and Polit­
ical Cleavage in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978).
28. This aim involves the cooperation of technocrats (mainly economists), who, 
with the military and central bureaucracy, form the current ruling "triarchy," with 
local Chinese financiers (cu kon g ) and foreign investors and experts in supporting 
roles. The most complete and balanced treatment of the technocrats is "Technocrats 
as Modernizers: The Economists of Indonesia's New Order," a 1975 University of
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Among the remaining Departments, the most direct high-level military participa­
tion occurs in Information, Social Affairs, Communications, Religion, Foreign Af­
fairs, Justice, and Manpower and Transmigration. Excepting only Communications 
and Manpower--where military penetration has remained at relatively high levels 
(between 40 percent and 82 percent) throughout the New Order--these Departments 
are also the only ones registering marked increases to high levels of such involve­
ment from 1966 to now.
Thus, besides a rise in military occupancy of certain categories of office in the 
higher central bureaucracy, there has occurred an accompanying military penetra­
tion of many particular programmatic sectors of government. The quantum leaps 
apparently occurred after the intra-regime power struggle peaking visibly in the 
January 1974 riots (Malari). In retrospect, Malari marks the watershed of the 
Suharto 1945 Generation faction's internal consolidation and consequent broad sei­
zure of the higher central bureaucracy.
There is no Department--even those overseen by the one civilian Coordinating 
Minister--in which the military is not suitably placed to control and remain apprised 
of its full range of activities. In nine of seventeen Departments, the Secretary- 
General and Inspector-General positions are both held by military officers. In the 
other eight Departments, one or the other of these posts is held by a military man. 
(See the table on the next page.) In addition, Department Ministers periodically 
report to the President, much more typically one by one rather than in a limited or 
full Cabinet setting. Many of these meetings result in a press conference in which 
the Minister merely announces the Presidential imprimatur on a heretofore unre­
vealed Departmental decision or passes on a Presidential instruction he has received.
Generally, the higher central bureaucracy has become rationalized, energized, 
and more coercive in pursuing the goals of the New Order. 29 In their own posi­
tions, civilian technocrats and career bureaucrats are at least as active public pro­
ponents of government policies as the military karyawan. Almost all of these civil­
ians hold their positions because they, just as the military karyawan, have in the 
past earned the trust of President Suharto or some other high-level military patron. 
If the current University of Indonesia Faculty of Economics team of leading techno­
crats has groomed successors, they are not yet numerous at these highest levels of 
the central bureaucracy. Moreover, none of these civilian bureaucrats belongs to 
an opposition party. All formally give sole loyalty (m onoloyalitas) to the govern­
ment-backed party-surrogate Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). No 
Department is any longer a fief of a particular party, such as Religion once was 
for the Nahdatul Ulama30 and Information for the Partai Nasional Indonesia.31
Michigan dissertation by John James MacDougall (a namesake not otherwise related 
to the present article's author, John A. MacDougall).
29. This global conclusion, originally drawn by Donald Emmerson in the mid-1970s, 
is amply confirmed today by recurrent editorials in the Indonesian press explicitly 
noting the striking power and intrusiveness of the central bureaucracy. Consistent 
with such patterns, about 62 percent of Golkar's candidates for the May 1982 parlia­
mentary (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council) elec­
tions re p o rte d ly  come from the government bureaucracy and 16 percent from ABRI.
( Indonesian O b s e rv e r, November 4, 1981). Indeed, the regime has been called a 
"bureaucratic polity" (Karl Jackson) and a "bureaucratic dictatorship" (Heri 
Akhmadi).
30. The conservative Muslim Scholars party, now "fused" with three other smaller
Muslim parties in the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Development Unity Party) .
















Home Affairs 89 M M - M M 4M, 1C
Foreign Affairs 50 M C - M M 1M, 3C
Defense and Security 100 M M 2M M 7M
Justice 50 M M - M C 1M, 3C
Information 57 M M - M M 3C
Finance 30 C C - C M 2M, 4C
Trade and Cooperatives 38 C C M M M 3C
Agriculture 40 c c C M M 2M, 3C
Industry 38 c c - M M 1M, 3C
Mining and Energy 14 c c - C M 3C
Public Works 12 c c c C M 3C
Communications 56 c M - M C 3M, 2C
Education 44 M c M M C 1M, 3C
Health 38 M M - M c 4C
Religion 56 M M - M c 2M, 3C
Social Affairs 57 M M - M M 3C
Manpower and Transmigration 50 M C C M M 1M, 2C
* For a listing of the Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants in these Departments, see Appendix A. 
f M stands for military, C for civilian incumbent.
$ Indicated for those Departments that have a Junior Minister.
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Except for Agriculture Minister Sudarsono and Junior Minister for Women's 
Affairs Lasiyah, every civilian Minister has one or more explicit military credential 
or linkages which could enhance his attractiveness to, or ability to work with, mili­
tary colleagues. These include:
• claimed military service during the 1945-1949 Revolution (at least Wijoyo, 
Sumarlin, Salim, Radius, Subroto, Suhud, Harun Zain, Daud Yusuf, 
Affandi, Martono) and afterward (Radius, Suhud);
• lecturing at the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Darat, Seskoad), National Defense Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan 
Nasional, Lemhanas), other military schools, and/or participation in the 
key Second (1966) or Third (1972) Army Seminars (at least Wijoyo, Salim, 
Wardhana, Subroto, Purnomosidi, Mochtar);
• involvement in planning or executing a major military campaign (Subroto);
• supervision of local manufacture of arms and military equipment (Habibie);
• service on the Hankam staff (Affandi);
• previous leadership in military-related or supported organizations (Martono, 
Batubara).
Military Karyawan Role Enhancement
Karyawan positions, even in the higher central bureaucracy, have not tradi­
tionally been regarded as choice assignments by Indonesian military officers. Com­
mand duty, tied to now venerated or romanticized memories of the Revolution against 
Dutch colonialism, suppression of nation-destroying regional rebellions, and assaults 
crushing repeated communist treachery, was seen as embodying most closely ABRI's 
heroic mission. The apparent loss of the "idealism of struggle" is now often bruited 
about in press interviews with senior officers. Indeed, the only remaining "battle­
field" today is East Timor and the last previous one (under Sukarno) was Malaysia, 
episodes which the intensely nationalistic ABRI leadership, as well as junior officers, 
find easier to equate with recent national disarray than past national glory.
Earlier disparagement of the karyawan role has also decreased as the perceived 
importance of controlling the government bureaucracy and its actual penetration by 
the military has increased. Wide public visibility through the mass media and the 
impeccable military credentials of many incumbents have also worked to enhance the 
prestige accorded the karyawan role by both younger and older military officers. 
Assignment and promotion committees within the Hankam increasingly understand 
that certain officers are particularly suited by administrative and technical talents 
or temperament for karya rather than military staff and command positions. A 
minority of officers may even aspire to certain karyawan positions regarded as 
"wet," offering opportunities for personal or institutional graft. General Yusuf 
has warned senior officers publicly that ABRI should not be used as a stepping- 
stone to prestigious karya slots.
The most prestigious service within ABRI is the Army, and it is the Army which 
holds four-fifths (81 percent) of military karyawan posts in the higher central bu­
reaucracy. Moreover, these Army karyawan are almost all high (flag-grade) com­
31. The Indonesian National Party, now "fused" with two other "nationalist" and 
two "non-Muslim religious" parties in the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indone­
sian Democracy Party).
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missioned officers (perwira) . Twelve percent are four-star Generals, 22 percent 
Lieutenant-Generals, 52 percent Major-Generals, and 10 percent Brigadiers. The 
remainder (two officers) are Colonels. In the other services, the distribution is 
even more skewed toward the higher ranks. Eighty-three percent of Navy karya- 
wan are Admirals or Vice-Admirals, 72 percent of Air Force karyawan Marshals or 
Vice-Marshals, and the sole Police representative a General.
Further, the average rank of military karyawan has clearly escalated from 
available 1966 and 1971 benchmarks. At the beginning of the New Order, a plural­
ity (44 percent) of Army karyawan were only Colonels or Lieu tenant-Colonels, 
whereas now the single most frequent rank is Major-General (52 percent). Younger 
officers can readily follow in the press periodic promotions in military rank among 
serving karyawan. These various shifts clearly have enhanced the clout of military 
karyawan in their respective Departments.
Generational Power Monopoly
The Generation of 1945 (Angkatan 45), participants in the Revolution, retains 
a near monopoly on military karyawan positions in the higher central bureaucracy. 
Most (61 percent) of these karyawan were born by 1925 (making them at least twen­
ty years old in 1945) and all but two of the remainder by 1930. Only Cabinet Secre­
tary Brigadier General Murdiono and Junior Minister for Youth Affairs Air Major 
Abdul Gafur belong clearly to the Young Generation (Generasi Muda) .
This solid control by the Generation of 1945 persists despite the fact that all 
those military karyawan born by 1925 have now been retired from active duty 
status.32 While some have received their karya appointments after or upon retire­
ment, more have simply retired in place. Even if these retired officers are no 
longer formally within some Hankam command chain, Hankam influence on them re­
mains heavy, quite apart from continuing influences by the webs of patron-client 
(bapak-anak buah) and close friendship (kawan akrab) ties in which they remain 
embedded.33 Hankam-run honorary promotion (in military rank) exercises are held 
for them even after retirement, most recently in September 1981.3“* The corpora- 
tist Association of Retired Members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Persatuan 
Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Pepabri), to which they 
belong, is controlled by regime loyalists.35 Pepabri enjoins them at its annual
32. The sole apparent exception is Lieutenant-General Kharis Suhud, the important 
Functional Affairs Chief-of-Staff in Hankam responsible for making military karya 
assignments.
33. B apak-anak buah  ties are vertical patronage relationships among unequals. 
While difficult to ascertain, their importance among the Indonesian military has long 
been conceded. Kawan akrab ties are horizontal cooperative relationships among 
peers. No one has systematically investigated the role these play among the Indo­
nesian military. Unless one posits marked cultural discontinuities between the pre­
dominantly Javanese military and their technocrat colleagues, these intimate friend­
ship bonds should be significant among the military as well (perhaps especially so 
among retired military, military karyawan, and graduates of the military academy 
in Magelang) . For the seminal article on kawan akrab ties among the technocrats 
(with some military examples as well), see John James MacDougall, "Elite Friendship 
Ties and Their Political Organizational Functions: The Case of Indonesia," B ijd ra -  
gen Tot de Taa l-, L a n d -, en V o lkenkunde , 137, 1 (1981), pp. 61-89.
34. For the complete list, see Indonesia Times, September 9, 1981.
35. Retired General Makmun Murod is the new General Chairman (Ketua Umum) .
He is a former Kostrad, Kostranas, and Kowilhan II Commander as well as ex-Army
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national congresses and other ceremonial occasions to remain always fighters 
(pe juang ) who can never be separated (d ip isa hka n ) from ABRI. 36
Given President Suharto's expressed desire to spend the rest of his life serv­
ing the people because there is nothing he wants to do more37 and the continuing 
readiness of his military age cohort to perform karya duty, any voluntary change 
of generation (a tih  generas i) within the phalanx of military karyawan is remote 
over the next five years. If such a generational succession among these karyawan 
has even been planned, it is not a subject of general public discussion as is the 
succession for active duty military in the staff and command structure.38
At most, carefully selected officers from the misnamed bridge generation (gene­
ra s i jembatan or schakel generatie) 39 have been seconded to some of these karya 
slots. These figures broadly encompass officers schooled at the wartime Akademi 
Militer in Yogyakarta (classes of 1948 and 1949/50),90 the short-lived and contro­
versial Candradimuka Academy at Bandung (in 1951 and 1952),1*1 and a variety of 
other shorter courses in Indonesia and abroad (mainly under General Nasution's 
sponsorship between 1950 and 1960) before the Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN), 
now known as Akabri (Akademi Militer Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), 
opened at Magelang (in 1957, with its first "fully professionally-trained" graduating 
class in 1960).
There is not one Magelang graduate among the military karyawan in the higher 
central bureaucracy. If there is any ultimate intent to move Young Generation
Chief-of-Staff, sensitive positions all. Pepabri deliberately tolerates a few "here­
tics," such as the Solo aristocrat Lieutenant-General GPH Jatikusumo, thereby neu­
tralizing them to some degree. Pepabri also publishes P urnaw iraw an , a generally 
tame journal for which ABRI retirees may write for those of like status.
36. For recent examples of this emotional appeal, see A ngkatan B ersen ja ta , Sep­
tember 22, 1981.
37. A n ta ra , November 5, 1981. FBIS D a ily  R eport Asia & P ac ific , Vol. 4, No. 217, 
November 10, 1981. The November 6, 1981, Kompas reports Suharto's actual words 
as the lead sentence of its lead story on page one: "Bagi saya tak ada lain, saya 
hanya in gin menggunakan sisa-sisa hidup saya untuk mengabdi bagi kepentingan 
rakyat." The statement, made to the third Congress of the government-backed 
KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee), 
seems Suharto's indirect Javanese way of saying he intends to remain President 
until he dies. Interestingly, A n ta ra 1 s English service quotes Suharto as having 
said he wished to serve "the nation and the state," not "the people" ( ra k y a t) ,  his 
actual choice of word.
38. For example, see the highly illuminating article by Bondan Winarno, "Alih 
Generasi: Alamiah atau Terencana?" in M u tia ra , No. 252, September 30-October 13, 
1981.
39. Misnamed because the concept is too often tied to officers' military education 
institution(s) rather than to age. As a consequence, many officers who self-iden­
tify as Generation of 1945 find themselves annoyingly categorized as "transitional" 
or "bridge," a less prestigious location.
40. Includes here Sabara (education interrupted), Yogi Supardi, and Atwar Nur- 
hadi on the active list; and Urip Widodo, Sukoco, Pang Suparto, and Aswasmarmo, 
retired.
41. Includes here Worang, Panggabean, Surono, Ahmad Tahir, and Tirtosudiro, 
all retired.
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officers into these karya jobs, it is difficult to understand why that process has 
not even begun. Suharto has instead facilitated moving retired officers of any age 
into these positions by an October 1981 regulation forming a military reserve.
The Successor Generation C ris is
By maintaining dominance over the state apparatus via its military karyawan 
staffing patterns, the Generation of 1945 leadership loyal to President Suharto 
seeks to assure itself the political stability required for a smooth generational 
transfer of leadership positions elsewhere within the Army by sometime in 1983.
What is entailed there is not simply a seeding of the Army staff and command struc­
ture with token representatives of the Young Generation but rather a wholesale 
intra-Army intergenerational power transfer.
The Generation of 1945 senior officers (from all current factions) made what 
amounts to a solemn contract to this effect in the Third Army Seminar in 1972.lf2 
The consensual results of those cross-generational meetings were subsequently 
published and used as instructional materials in the various military educational 
institutions. Defense Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions given 
assurances this power transfer will occur and should not be resisted, and other 
senior Army spokesmen have cautioned civilians neither to worry about nor meddle 
in the process.
The overall design thus eventually would entail two major power centers: the 
retired military karyawan of the 1945 Generation in the higher central bureaucracy 
and the active duty Army staff and command structure of the Young Generation.
For some indeterminate period of time the cleavage between the retired Army offi­
cers in control of politics and the active duty Army officers in control of the guns 
would therefore be sharply drawn. The formula for regime maintenance would 
essentially be shifted from depoliticization to repoliticization.
It is not inconceivable that such an arrangement could remain stable, but its 
longevity would be inherently limited by the aging and dying off of the 1945 Genera­
tion. Before then, it strains credulity to think the 1945 Generation will voluntarily 
relinquish on schedule the top Hankam posts it now so tightly grasps as levers 
controlling the career fates of the Army's Young Generation. At year-end 1981 
just four Magelang graduates--Brigadier-Generals Sugiarto, Edy Sudrajat, Tri Su- 
trisno, and Sarwono--had been appointed Military Area ("Divisional") Commanders
42. This March 1972 seminar arose as a consequence of a Seskoad survey ostensi­
bly revealing marked difference in outlook between the then current class and the 
1945 Generation leadership (only the Seskoad students were actually surveyed).
The seminar aimed to forge an inter-generational agreement on which of the values 
of the 1945 Generation could be transferred as an inheritance to the Young Genera­
tion and on the mechanisms for achieving this end. A very abbreviated English 
version of this "agreement" (actually the 1945 Generation version only) is given in 
Nugroho Notosusanto, The T ra n s fe r o f  Values in  the Indonesian Armed Forces, pub­
lished by Hankam's Center for Armed Forces History in 1974. The major and lengthy 
summary volume in Indonesian is titled Dharma Pusaka 45. At least five other vol­
umes resulting from the seminar are publicly available: Himpunan Am anat, Himpunan 
P rasaran, Himpunan Hasil Perumusan S in d ika t I s /d  V I , and Academic A pp ra isa l 
tentang Pewarisan dan In te g ra s i. This mine of information bearing on the issue of 
generational succession remains unanalyzed by outsiders. Extensive surveys of 
1969-1978 Akabri graduates (all perwira) in 1978-79 and 1980-81 have distressed 
ABRI's 1945 Generation leadership once again. A glimpse of these survey results 
is provided in "Sekolah Tentara, Tidak Kebal," Tempo, May 30, 1981, pp. 66-67.
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(Pangdam) or their Chief-of-Staff (Kasdam). The change of generations within the 
Army clearly has been begun by General Yusuf but is not yet proceeding at a pace 
the Young Generation might have anticipated.
Even leaving aside other political forces in Indonesia, it is far from clear the 
Army's Young Generation would accede to the formation, much less the temporary 
institutionalization, of such a new model New Order. Essentially, the emerging 
arrangement consigns the Young Generation military to a continuing secondary and 
subordinate political role. Save perhaps for some adroit token appointments of 
younger officers, only the 1945 Generation military would reap the top positional 
rewards in the civil (s ip il) side of ABRI's dual function (dwi fu n g s i) . Only the 
Young Generation would be performing the military (m ilite r ) side.
It is possible, but on the basis of present evidence unlikely, that the Suharto 
1945 Generation faction actually now posits a pressing, near-future need to reduce 
significantly this cleavage. Should such a felt need develop, it may come too late 
for Suharto himself, and perhaps his faction generally, to reap the full benefits 
for regime perpetuation of moving toward construction of a network of interpersonal 
links across generational lines. At present, General Yusuf, by virtue of his pre­
siding (more intimately than Suharto) over assignments and promotions and his 
well-publicized prodigious travel to field commands, would appear to be the princi­
pal beneficiary of such interpersonal bonds as have been forged. It is implausible 
that approximately six thousand younger Army officers actually have, or personally 
see, their fates, orchestrated primarily by Suharto himself.
ABRI doctrine does not sanction generational stratification in the carrying out 
of its dual function. At minimum, the Young Generation could charge a deviation 
from a still valid core ABRI doctrine. But another more likely outcome would seem 
an increasingly active private and even public probing of the operational meaning 
of ABRI's dual function in a changing Indonesia. It is likely this will mark the 
emergence at the national level of the Young Generation's more politically skilled 
officers. This process may be spurred by General Yusuf's March 1982 declaration 
that publication of a sounder ( leb ih  u tu h ) formulation of ABRI's civil mission ( ke- 
ka ryaan ) was imminent.
Already several retired 1945 Generation ABRI factions have attacked the ruling 
1945 Generation faction for expanding the civil side of the dual function far beyond 
what was originally envisaged. Past writing by widely respected current ABRI 
1945 Generation "outs" has comprised major textual material in the professional mili­
tary education of the ABRI Young Generation. **3 Among others, retired General
43. The impact of the four-year academy course at Magelang for Army cadets 
( taruna) is great. Cadets are effectively isolated from the surrounding civilian 
society and subjected to rigorous indoctrination and training. Discipline is harsh. 
A ngkatan Bersenjata  and other official ABRI publications are staple reading fare. 
Cadets have better classrooms, accommodations, and food than in most non-military 
educational institutions in Indonesia. When allowed to leave the campus for Mage­
lang, an old garrison town of the Dutch colonial army, they are discouraged from 
eating at roadside stalls (in favor of the better restaurants) or using pedicabs (in 
favor of motorized transport). They graduate with an expectation they will become 
a ruling class and exhibit considerable self-confidence and esprit de corps. Besides 
being very disproportionately Javanese, about 40 percent of new Akabri cadets 
come from ABRI families. For more details, see various issues of A k a b r i and Peter 
Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-Colonial Armed Forces," B u lle tin  o f  Concerned Asian  
S cholars, 7, 3 (July-September 1975), pp. 14-21.
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Nasution, considered influential among these post-Revolutionary officers, has 
widely published stinging critiques of the later New Order regime. ^
Indonesia's succession politics are not occurring in a regional vacuum. While 
politically aware officers remain Indonesia-centric in outlook, more attention is paid 
other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members than in past years. 
Many of Singapore's and Malaysia's younger Ministerial-level leadership have visited 
with their Indonesian counterparts, some many times. Dr. Mahathir's ascension to 
the Malaysian Prime Ministership was especially widely commented on in the Indone­
sian press as a smooth and successful generational transfer of power which Indone­
sia might admire or even emulate. His subsequent anti-corruption campaign has 
been similarly acknowledged.
But Indonesia has no dominant ruling mass-based political party comparable to 
Malaysia's UMNO (United Malay National Organization) or Singapore's PAP (People's 
Action Party) through which those countries' generational successions have so far 
been so well managed. Nor on closer examination would the "free-fight liberalism" 
within UMNO or the PAP's "guided democracy" meet ideological canons of accepta­
bility among almost any of Indonesia's dominant and alternative elites. Still, the 
plain facts of ongoing successful generational transitions in these two neighboring 
states will aggravate the naggingly insistent perception that Indonesia's own change 
of generations is a necessary end without a sufficient means. The odds for anomic 
change therefore increase.
44. Two groups of ABRI's 1945 Generation "outs" cluster in the Forum for Study 
and Communication of Retired Officers (Forum Studi dan Komunikasi Purna Yudha, 
or Fosko) and the Institute for Constitutional Awareness (Lembaga Kesadaran Ber- 
konstitusi, or LBK). In one of the rare studies of retired ABRI officers, these two 
more vocal factions are discussed by Ulf Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis in Indonesia: 
Fact, Fiction, Predictions," Asian S u rv e y , 21, 8 (August 1981), pp. 815-37. For a 
forthright statement by retired General Nasution on how he perceives the New Or­
der to have deviated from his initial formulation of the "dual function" concept, see 
his "Dwi Fungsi: Pada Mulanya dan Kini," Prism a, 9 (December 1980), pp. 39-43.
A cautious,but essentially sympathetic,summary of Nasution's views may also be 
found in Ulf Sundhaussen, Social Policy Aspects in  Defense and S e c u rity  P lanning  
in  Indonesia , 1945-1977, Southeast Asian Occasional Paper Series (Queensland: 
James Cook University, 1980). Retired officers and their associations will play 




THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET AND 
SENIOR DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS
The positions and incumbents comprising the Indonesian "higher central bu­
reaucracy," as the term is used in this article, are listed in full below. The list is 
believed current as of mid-December 1981. One incumbent (asterisked) is the last 
known occupant of his position and may or may not still be current. Personnel 
changes which are known to have occurred since this list was compiled are men­
tioned in footnotes. Military officers are distinguished from civilians by the mili­
tary rank preceding their names. The notation (R) after such a rank means that 
the officer is retired whereas (?) means that it is not known whether the officer is 
retired or on active duty. Absence of either notation means that the officer is on 
the active rolls. Titles placed before or after names are usually abbreviated and 






























Doktor (holder of doctoral degree)
Doktorandus/Doktoranda (male/female holder of doctoral degree not 
involving dissertation)
General (Army)
Haji (one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca)
Insinyur (holder of engineering degree)
Kiai (venerable Islamic religious teacher or scholar)
Roman do Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order)
Lieutenant-General (Army)
Master of Arts
Master of Arts and Science
Major-General (Army)
Master of Business Administration 
Master of Public Administration 
Master of Public Health 
Master of Science 
Nyonya (Mrs., Madam)
Doctor of Philosophy 
Profesor (Professor)
Raden (Javanese aristocratic title)
Raden Mas (Javanese aristocratic title somewhat higher than Raden) 
Retired (from active military duty)
Retired or active military status not known 
Sarjana Ekonomi (Master of Economics)
Sarjana Hukum (Master of Law)
Last known incumbent in position
Positions and Incumbents




Minister of State/State Secretary 
Cabinet Secretary 
Military Secretary 





Political and Security Affairs 
(Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 
Defense and Security, Justice, 
Information)
Economic, Financial, and Industrial 
Affairs (Finance, Trade and Coop­
eratives, Agriculture, Industry, 
Mining and Energy, Public Works, 
Communications)
People's Welfare (Education and 
Culture, Health, Religion, Social 
Affairs, Manpower and Transmi­
gration)
Junior Minister, Women's Affairs
Ministers of State
Perfecting the State Apparatus 
Research and Technology 
Development Supervision and 
Environment
Lt-Gen Sudharmono SH 
Brig-Gen Drs Murdiono 
Air Vice Marshal Kardono
Lt-Gen (R) R Solihin Gautama Purwanegara
Gen (R) Maradean Panggabean
Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro
Gen (R) Surono Reksodimejo 
Ny Lasiyah Sutanto SH
Dr Johannes Baptists Sumarlin 
P ro f Dr Ir Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie
Prof Dr Emil Salim
E. Sukasah Somowijaya 
Maj-Gen (R) Sujono Humardani 
Maj-Gen (R) Hein Victor Worangf 
Maj-Gen (R) Tahir
Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants
Home Affairs 
Minister
S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General 
Directors - General
Social and Political Affairs 







S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General
Gen (R) Amir Machmud 
Maj-Gen (R) R Suprapto 
Maj-Gen H Eddy Sahara
Maj-Gen (R) R Prapto Prayitno
Brig-Gen (?) H Ahmad Adnawijaya 
Maj-Gen (R) Drs Umar Said Joyosaputro 
Maj-Gen Daryono SH 
Drs Atar Tarigan Sibero
Prof Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja 
Air Vice Marshal Sudharmono 
Lt-Gen (R) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo




Foreign Economic, Social and 
Cultural Affairs
Safeguarding of Foreign Relations 
Protocol and Consular Affairs
Defense and Security
Minister/Commander of the 
Armed Forces
Deputy Commander of the Armed 
Forces/Commander, Kopkamtib 
Chief of Staff, Kopkamtib 
I nspector - General 
Chief of Staff, Operations 
Chief of Staff, Administration 
Chief of Staff, Functional Affairs 
Chief of Staff, Army 
Chief of Staff, Navy 
Chief of Staff, Air Force 




I nspector- General 
Directors - General 
Law and Legislation 





S ecretary - General 
I n spector - General 
D irector s - G eneral 
General Information 
Radio, Television, and Film 
Press and Graphics Development
Finance
Minister
S ecretary - General 
I nspector-General 
Directors - General 
Budget 
Tax
Domestic Monetary Affairs 
Foreign Monetary Affairs 
Customs
State Monetary Control
H Munawar Syadzali MA 
Gusti Rusli Noor
Maj-Gen (R) RM Suyono Wiryo Atmojo SH 
Yoop Avef
Gen Andi Muhammad Yusuf
Admiral R. Sudomo
Gen Wijoyo Suyono
Air Vice-Marshal (?) Subambang
Vice Admiral Muhammad Romly
Lt-Gen Ignatius Yogi Supardi
Lt-Gen M. Kharis Suhud
Gen S . Poniman
Admiral Waluyo Sugito
Air Marshal Ashadi Cahyadi
Police Gen Dr Awaluddin Jamin MPA
Lt-Gen Ali Said SH




Ahmad Arif SH MPA 
Maj-Gen (R) Nichlany Sudarjo
Lt-Gen (R) Ali Murtopo
Maj-Gen (R) Sutikno Lukitodisastro
Maj-Gen (R) Drs H Slamet Heryanto
Drs Joko Kartodiharjo MPA 
Drs Sumadi 
H Sukarno SH
Prof Dr Ali Wardhana 
Maj-Gen (R) Elly Sungkono 
Yusuf L. Indradewa SH
Maj-Gen (R) Yusuf Ramly 
Drs Salamun A. T.
Drs Oskar Suryaatmaja
Drs R Sugito Sastromijoyo MA Sc
Lt-Gen (R) Wahono
Drs Gandhi
t Yoop Ave has been replaced by R Achmad Jumiril. 
t Hadipurnomo has been replaced by Harsono Adisumarto SH MPA. 
§ Suroto has been replaced by H Rusli SH.
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S ecretary - General 
Inspector- General 






Junior Minister, Food Production 
S ecretary- General 
Inspector- General 








S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General 
Director s - General 
Basic Metal Industry 
Basic Chemical Industry 
Miscellaneous Industry 
Small Industry
Mining and Energy 
Minister
S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General 
Dir ectors - General 
General Mining 




Junior Minister, People's Housing 
Secretary-General 
Inspector-G eneral 





Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH
Vice Admiral Lalu Manambai Abdulkadir
Maj-Gen (R) R Sukoco
Karjono Wirioprawiro
Prof Dr Suhadi Mangkusuwondo
Prof Dr Ir Sujanadi Ronohadiwiryo MSc
Prof Ir Sudarsono Hadisaputro
Ir Ahmad Affandi
Maj-Gen (R) Panuju
Maj-Gen (R) R Mung Parhadimulyo*
Ir Wardoyo
Brig-Gen (?) R Pang Suparto Atmodipuro 
Vice Admiral Iman Sarjonof 
Dr Sujarwo
Prof Dr Ir Johannes Humantal Hutasoit
Ir Abdul Rauf Suhud 
Maj-Gen (R) Ir Agus Sujono 
Commodore (R) R. J. Sulamet
Ir Eman Yogasara 
Ir Hartarto Sastrosunarto 
Ir Kusudiarso Hadinoto 
Brig-Gen Gitosewoyo SH
Prof Dr Subroto 
Drs Sutaryo Sigit 
Col At war Nurhadi
Prof Dr John Ario Katili 
Ir Wijarso
Prof Dr Ir Samaun Samadikun
D.r Purnomosidi Hajisaroso 
Drs Cosmas Batubara 
Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjoj;
Col (R) Imam Sukoto§
Ir Suryatin Sastromijoyo 
Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono I 
Ir Radinal Mochtar
f This position is now occupied by Rear Admiral Aburachman.
$ Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjo has died and been replaced by Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono. 
§ This position is now occupied by Drs Herman Rusdi Usman.
I Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono has been replaced by Ir Y. Sudaryoko.
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Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin 




Air Vice Marshal (?) Sugiri
Maj-Gen (R) Suryadi
Lt-Gen (R) H Ahmad TirtosudiroJ
Communications
Minister
S ecr etary - General 
Inspector-General 




Post and Telecommunications 
Tourism
Education and Culture 
Minister
Junior-Minister, Youth Affairs 
S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General 
Directors- General
Basic and Secondary Education 
Higher Education 
Extra-curricular Activities, 







Public Health Development 
Health Services 
Food and Drug Control 




S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General 
Directors- General
Islamic Guidance and Haj Affairs 
Islamic Institutions Development 
Protestant Guidance 
Catholic Guidance 
Hindu and Buddhist Guidance
Social Affairs 
Minister
S ecretary - General 
Inspector-General
Prof Dr Daud Yusuf 
Air Major Abdul Gafur Tengku Idris 
Lt-Gen (R) Sutanto Wiryoprasonto 
F. X. Sudiyana SH
Brig-Gen (R) Prof Darji Darmodiharjo SH 
Prof Dr Ir Doddy Achdiyat Tisna Amijaya
Prof Dr Washington Pandapotan Napitupulu 
Prof Dr Ny Haryati Subadio
Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat 
Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suyoto 
Dr Bahrawi Wongsokusomo MPH
Lt-Gen (R) H Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara 
Brig-Gen (R) H Aswasmarmo SH 
H Abdul Qadir Basalamah
Maj-Gen (R) H Ahmad Burhani Cokrohandoko
H Anton Timur Jaelani MA
Pestos Nehemia Harefa
Maj-Gen (R) Ignatius Joko Mulyono
Gde Puja MA SH
Maj-Gen (R) Saparjo
Maj-Gen (R) Albertus Maruli Tambunan
Maj-Gen (?) Ibnu Hartomo
Dr R Subekti Harjodiwiryo MPH 
Dr IGM§ Brata Ranuh MPH 
Dr Midian Sirait
Dr M. Adhyatma MPH
f No biography available. According to one source, a possible Navy Vice Admiral. 
However, no military title appears in his Jakarta telephone book listing.
$ This position is now occupied by Yoop Ave.




Rehabilitation and Social Services 
Social Aid
Manpower and Transmigration 
Minister





Development and Use of Manpower 
Protection and Care of Manpower 
Transmigration
Drs Agung Yuwono Cokrosuseno 
Drs Yuwono
Drs Ade Harun Alrasyid
Prof Drs Harun Alrasyid Zain 
Martono
Maj-Gen (R) Urip Widodo SH 
Maj-Gen (R) H Marsan Siregar SH
Ir Drs Danang Jokowatoro Yudonegoro 
Utoyo Usman SH 
Maj-Gen (R) H Kadarusno
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APPENDIX B
HIGHER STATE INSTITUTIONS AND 
NON-DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNMENT BOARDS
The abbreviations and conventions used here parallel those in Appendix A. 
Positions and incumbents in this list are believed current as of mid-December 1981. 
Persons with an asterisk after their names, however, are the last known incumbents 
in their positions and may or may not currently hold them.
Higher State Institutions
People’ s Consultative Assembly/People’s Representative 
Council (MPR/DPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/ 








Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung)
Head
Deputy Head











Office of the Attorney-General 
(Kejaksaan Agung)













Maj-Gen (R) R Kartijo Sastrodinoto 
Brig-Gen (R) H Ahmad Lamo 
Lt-Gen Wang Suwandi SH
Lt-Gen Mujono SH 
Purwoto S . Gandasubrata SH
Dr KH Idham Khalid
Prof Dr Sunawar Sukowati SH
Lt-Gen (R) Gusti Pangeran Hario Jatikusumo
Maj-Gen (R) Dr Sujono Sumodiwiryo
Dr H Jaelani Naro SH
Gen (R) Umar Wirahadikusumah 
Maj-Gen (R) R H Ahmad Sudrajat
Lt-Gen (R) Ismail Saleh SH 
Kohar Hari Sumamo SH 
Brig-Gen Sugiri Cokrodijoyo SH 
Brig-Gen (R) Datuk R. Mulia SH 
Muhammad Salim SH
f The same top officials now head both institutions.
% Mohamad Isnaeni has been replaced by Drs Harjantho Sumodisastro.
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Non-Departmental Government Boards
State Personnel Administration Board (BAKN,
Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara)
Head Maj-Gen (R) A. E. Manihuruk
State Administration Institute
(LAN, Lembaga Administrasi Negara) 
Head
Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik)
Head
State Code Institute 
(Lembaga Sandi Negara)
Head
Logistics Affairs Board 
(Bulog, Badan Urusan Logistik)
Head
Deputy Head
National Atomic Energy Agency 
(Batan, Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional)
Director - G eneral
Telecommunications Council 
(Dewan Telekomunikasi)
Prof Dr Sondang Paian Siagian MPA
H M. Abdulmajid
Dr Rubiono Kertopati*
Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH 
Maj-Gen (R) Sukriya Atmaja
Prof A . Baiquni MSc PhD
Head Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin
National Development Planning Board (Bappenas,
Badan Perancanaan Pembangunan Nasional)
Head Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro
Deputy Head Prof Dr Johannes Baptista Sumarlin
National Space and Aviation Institute (Lapan,
Lembaga Penerbangan Antariksa Nasional)
Head Air Vice Marshal (R) Dr R Sunaryo
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI,
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia)
Head Prof Dr Ir H Bachtiar Rifai
National Archives (Arsip Nasional)
Head Dra Sumartini
National Survey and Mapping Coordination Board 
(Badan Koordinasi Survey dan Pemetaan Nasional)
Head Maj-Gen (?) Ir Pranoto Asmoro
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National Defense and Security Council (Wanhankamnas,
Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional)
Secretary-General Lt-Gen (R) Ahmad Wiranatakusumah
Deputy Secretary-General Admiral Mahmud Subarkah
National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN,
Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berancana Nasional)
Head Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat
Capital Investment Coordinating Board 
(BKPM, Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal)
Head Ir Suhartoyo
Technology Study and Application Board (BPPT,
Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi)
Head Prof Dr Ir Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie
Bank Indonesia
Governor Drs Rahmat Saleh SE
Operation Order Central 
(Opstibpus, Operasi Tertib Pusat)
Head Maj-Gen Empi Yohan Ranter SHf
Board for Molding, Education, Implementation, Orientation,
Living and Practice of the Five Basic Principles (BP7,
Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila) $
Head Maj-Gen (R) Hari Suharto SH
State Intelligence Coordinating Body 
(Bakin, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara)§
Head Gen (R) Yoga Sugama
Deputy Head Lt-Gen L. Benny Murdani
f Apparently still on active duty although past age 55.
$ Not readily comprehensible either in Indonesian or English. This is also at least 
the second version of what the seven Ps stand for. For the political significance 
of this, see David Jenkins, "The Tale of P4--and How P7 Irked P3," Far Eastern  
Economic Review, July 24, 1981.
§ Not listed as Non-Departmental Government Board in any official listing but in­
cluded here on de facto basis.
118
APPENDIX C
SELECTED BIOGRAPHIC SOURCE MATERIALS
The variety of sources from which biographic information on the Indonesian 
military may be drawn is quite large. What appears below reflects only one of these 
types of sources: compilations of biographies using a uniform format. Most of these 
resources also include numerous biographies of civilians. Name lists of several 
types proved quite valuable as well but are not included here. The author would 
appreciate knowing of additional major compilations.
Major Biographic Compilations
A. Official Hankam Directories
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Pusat Sejarah ABEI. Siapa-apa (Who's Who) 
Pejabat Teras Hankam /ABR I. Penerbitan Sementara Edisi Ketiga. 1971.
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Lembaga Sejarah. Siapa-apa (Who's Who) S ta f 
Pertahanan-Keam anan. Penerbitan Sementara Pertama. 1967.
B. Official and Quasi-Official DPR/MPR Directories
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. B uku  Pelengkap IV  Pemilihan Umum 1977. Ringkasan  
Riwayat Hasil Pemilihan Tahun 1977. B uku  I .  B uku  I I .  (2 vol.) Circa 1978.
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. Ringkasan R iwayat H fdup Anggo ta  D PR D -I. Hasil Pemi­
lihan Umum Tahun 1977 u n tu k  Wilayah Jawa. 1979.
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. Ringkasan R iwayat H idup Anggota D PR D -I. Hasil Pemi­
lihan Umum Tahun 1977 u n tu k  Wilayah Sumatera. 1979.
Departemen Dalam Negeri, Direkorat Jenderal Sosial Politik (Direkorat Pembinaan 
Umum). Ringkasan R iw ayat H idup A nggota D PR D -I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum 
Tahun 1977 u n tu k  Wilayah Kalimantan & Sulawesi. 1980.
Departemen Dalam Negeri, Direktorat Jenderal Sosial Politik (Direktorat Pembinaan 
Umum). Ringkasan R iwayat H idup A nggota DPR D -I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum 
Tahun 1977 u n tu k  Wilayah Nusa Tenggara, M a luku , dan Ir ia n  Jaya. 1980.
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. R iw ayat H idup A nggo ta -A nggo ta  Majelis Perm usyawara- 
tan R akyat Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1971. (1 vol.) Circa 1973.
Parlaungan, compiler. Hasil R akja t Memilih Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen (H asil Pemilihan 
Umum Pertama— 1955) d i R epub lik  Indonesia. 1956.
Kementerian Penerangan. Kami P erkena lkan ........... ! 1954.
C. Privately Published Directories
Tim Redaksi Majalah Tempo. Apa & Siapa Sejumlah O rang Indonesia 1981-1982. 
Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1981.
Roeder, O. G ., and Mahmud, Mahiddin, compilers. Who's Who in  Indonesia. 
Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980.
Roeder, O. G. Who's Who in Indonesia. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971.
The Indonesian M ilita ry  Leaders: B iograph ica l and O th e r B ackground Data. 2nd 
ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1979.
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Who's Who in Indonesian M ilita ry . 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1977. 
Who's Who in  Indonesian Business. 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1975.
D. Official Japanese Source
Gunseikanbu. O rang Indonesia Jang Terkemoeka d i Djawa. Tjetakan Pertama.
2604 (1944).
Minor Biographic Compilations
Departemen Sosial, Badan Pembina Pahlawan Pusat. Pahlawan Pembela Kemerde- 
kaan. Seri Pahlawan Nasional. 1972.




SELECTED MONOGRAPH LENGTH STUDIES 
ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
Below is a reading list of monograph length studies focusing explicitly on the 
Indonesian military or containing much significant material on it not easily available 
elsewhere. Relevant article-length materials and general works on Indonesian poli­
tics have been excluded in the interest of drawing attention to a limited number of 
studies containing large amounts of information. The list is not exhaustive. West­
ern sources in English prevail, but some Indonesian primary sources and a variety 
of viewpoints are represented.
Akhmadi, Heri. B reak in g  the Chains o f  O ppression o f  the Indonesian People.
Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1981.
Anderson, David. "Military Politics in East Java: A Study of the Origins and 
Development of the Armed Forces in East Java between 1945-1948." Ph.D. 
dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976.
Anderson, Benedict, and McVey, Ruth. A P re lim ina ry  A na lys is  o f  the O ctober 1, 
1965 Coup in  Indonesia . Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim 
Reports Series, 1971.
Crouch, Harold. The A rm y and P olitics in  Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1978.
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Markas Besar Tentera Nasional Indonesia Angka- 
tan Darat. Dharma Pusaka 45. Jakarta, 1972.
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat. 
D o k tr in  Perdjuangan T N l-A D  "T R I-U B A Y A -C A K T I" . Bandung, 1966.
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Staf Teritorial. D o k tr in  T e r ito ria l Nusantara. 
B u k u -I & B u k u - l l .  Jakarta, 1978.
Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan, Pusat Sejarah ABRI. 30 Tahun A ngkatan B e r-  
senjata R epub lik  Indonesia . Jakarta, 1976.
Gregory, Ann. "Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political 
Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1976.
Harvey, Barbara. Permesta: H a lf a Rebellion. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project Monograph Series, 1977.
Harvey, Barbara. "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965." 
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1974.
Hering, B. B. Sukarno and His S o ld ie rs : A Docum entary S tu d y  o f  the T .N . l.  
Brussels: Centre du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme Orient Monograph 
Series, 1977.
Maynard, Harold. "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia 
and the Philippines." Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976.
McVey, Ruth. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army, 
Part I," Indonesia , 11 (April 1971), pp. 131-76; and "Part II," Indonesia , 13 
(April 1972), pp. 147-81.
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Mrazek, Rudolf. The U nited States and the Indonesian M ilita ry  1945-1965: A S tu d y  
o f  an In te rv e n tio n . (2 vols.) Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 
Oriental Institute, 1968.
Moehkardi. Akadem i M ilite r  Yogya Dalam Perjuangan P is ik  1945-1949. Jakarta:
PT Inaltu, 1977.
Muhammad Rusli Karim. Peranan A B R I Dalam P o lit ik . Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu,
1981.
Nasution, Abdul Haris. Fundamentals o f  G u e rr illa  W arfare. Singapore: Donald 
Moore Books, 1965.
Notosusanto, Nugroho. The PET A A rm y d u r in g  the Japanese Occupation o f  Indo ­
nesia. Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979.
Pauker, Guy. The Indonesian D octrine  o f  T e r r ito r ia l W arfare and T e rr ito r ia l 
Management. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963.
Robison, Richard. "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia, 1965-1975." 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977.
Roeder, O. G. The Sm iling General: P res ident S uharto  o f  Indonesia . Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1970.
Simatupang, Tahi Bonar. R eport from  B anaran: Experiences d u r in g  the People's 
War. Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1972.
Sundhaussen, Ulf. "The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the
Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: The Siliwangi Division and the Army Head­
quarters." Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1971.
Utrecht, Ernst. The Indonesian A rm y : A S oc io -po litica l S tu d y  o f  an Arm ed, P r iv i­
leged Group in  the Developing C oun tries . Queensland: James Cook University 
South East Asian Monograph Series, 1980.
